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A NEW APPROACH TO MULTI-HAZARD ANALYSIS  
 
 
Sebastiano MARASCO1, Ali ZAMANI NOORI2, Omar KAMMOUH3, Gian Paolo CIMELLARO4 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Multi-hazard engineering is increasingly recognized as a serious worldwide concern. In this paper, the principle 
of multi-hazard is applied to an essential steel structure (a hospital) located in California, US. The studied 
structure is assumed to be exposed to a sequence of three different cascading hazards (earthquake, blast, and 
fire).  First, non-linear time-history analyses are performed and the seismic response of the structure is evaluated. 
The seismic input is assumed to cause damage to the hospital’s power supply which it turns to generate an 
explosion. The probability of explosion is estimated accounting for the probabilities of fuel leakage, fuel 
concentration, and ignition. A set of twelve blast intensity levels is considered in the analysis, corresponding to 
the different quantity of fuel content inside the tank. Afterward, a fire hazard is generated following the 
explosion, whose intensity level is evaluated using the compartmental heat flux. The effect of the fire is 
translated into an increase in the steel’s temperature, and damage is consequently evaluated. A methodology is 
proposed to accumulate the cascading damage caused by multi-hazard based on the conditional probability of 
occurrence. This method is capable of predicting the damage severity of the structural and non-structural 
components with a high accuracy. The proposed multi-hazard method is considered a significant step in 
improving the accuracy of loss estimation and in providing risk mitigation measures within the resilience-based 
environment. The results obtained in this paper verify the effectiveness and the practicality of the proposed 
method. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Large parts of the world are subjected to multiple natural, manmade, and artificial hazards. The rising 
of global population and the massive economic development in areas prone to disasters have increased 
the chance of multiple catastrophic incidents, which lead to disruption of buildings and infrastructures. 
Multi-hazard engineering and related mitigation risks play a key role in design and retrofitting of 
buildings. The multi-hazard assessment has to be performed by comparing risks of cascading 
mechanisms related to triggered hazard events. Padgett et al. (2010) evaluated hazard intensities to 
accurately predict the vulnerability of bridges using a multivariate regression analysis of the data 
obtained by surveys after hurricane Katrina. The American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC 
2005) has provided seismic specifications of improved connection details for steel moment-frame and 
wood-frame shear. These specifications have been based on the numerical analyses of post-disaster 
data collected using surveys following 1989 Loma Prieta and 1994 Northridge earthquakes. 
 
The risk assessments of structures that are exposed to more than one hazard are determined by 
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adopting the performance-based approach. For example, Barbato et al. (2013) suggested a novel 
assessment method that involved the evaluation of the individual impacts of the interaction among 
hurricane wind, flood, windborne debris, and rainfall hazards in the Performance-Based Hurricane 
Engineering (PBHE) framework. The performance of steel piers under seismic action was investigated 
by Bruneau et al. (2006). The simulation of large-magnitude earthquakes and the consequent 
explosions confirmed the capacity of the materials to resist to earthquakes and blast separately, but not 
a simultaneous combination of the two hazards.  
 
Multi-hazard design starts with the structural and non-structural analysis for individual hazard. The 
location, magnitude and frequency of occurrence of each hazard have to be estimated through a 
probabilistic approach. Several probabilistic approaches have been proposed for multiple-hazard risk 
assessment. In this paper, the methodology developed by Marasco et al. (2017) is adopted to estimate 
the total amount of structural damage caused by sequential hazard. Earthquake, blast and fire have 
been considered as sequential hazards and numerical analyses have been performed. The combination 
of the structural damage for sequential hazards is evaluated according to Bayes’ theorem. The 
methodology has been applied to a steel structure hospital located in California, US. The first section 
of the paper provides a detailed description of the methodology, while the second part illustrates its 
applicability through a case study building. Lastly, a numerical example of cumulative structural 
damage estimation is performed. 
 
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
 
In the Performance-Based framework the structural vulnerability is conventionally expressed in terms 
of probability to exceed a stated performance objective when the structure is subjected to a certain 
level of hazard. In case of sequential hazardous events, the probabilistic correlation between the main 
hazard and the occurrence of the other hazards has to be estimated to assess the performance of the 
structural system. In this paper, the occurrence of a sequential hazard for a given Intensity Measure 
(IM) of the main hazard is estimated following a probabilistic Bayesian approach. The Figure 1 
depicts a simplified scheme of the hazard analysis conducted in a multiple-hazard scenario. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Hazard analysis framework for sequential multiple-hazards 
 
The estimation of the conditional probability P(HI/HJ) that one hazardous event (I) occurs as 
consequence of another hazard (J), is provided by using specific physical models. As example, a steel 
tank containing flammable materials in a seismic zone is considered. The probability to have the 
explosion of the tank due to an earthquake with a given intensity is strictly dependent firstly on the 
mechanism of ignition of the material inside the tank; and secondly the failure modes and equipment 
damage of the tank. 
 
A physical model has to be capable to describe the fragility of the tank with reference to the possible 
trigger of the hazardous mechanism. Identifying the most probable failure mode and modeling the 
geometry of the tank, a numerical analysis has to be performed to evaluate the blast fragility of the 
tank. In order to take into account different earthquake scenarios, several numerical analyses have to 
be carried out. According to the mechanism of ignition, a maximum threshold of the earthquake 
response parameter of the tank has to be fixed. When this maximum limit is exceeded, the probability 
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to have explosion is equal to 1, and 0 otherwise. The probability to have explosion after earthquake is 
obtained by lognormal fitting of the results. This simple procedure is able to provide a conditional 
probability of explosion due to earthquake for different seismic intensity. 
  
The vulnerability of a structural system to a hazard is expressed in terms of fragility functions derived 
from numerical analyses for a given damage state. In a multi-hazard scenario, the prediction of the 
level of structural damage has to take into account the chain effects. They represent the modification 
of the structural characteristics caused by the previous hazard. Therefore, the sequential hazards are 
treated as depend phenomena. The cumulative damage probability due to sequential hazardous events 
(P(DS<ds)) is expressed as product between conditioned probability of the sequential events and the 
exceedance damage probability for single hazard. Equation 1 gives the cumulative probability to 
exceed a specified level of damage according to the proposed methodology. 
 
( ) ( 1 1| 0)
( 2 2 | 1) ( 2 | 1)
( 3 3 | 2) ( 3 | 2) ( 2 | 1)
...
P DS ds P DSH dsh SP
P DSH dsh SP P H H
P DSH dsh SP P H H P H H
   
   
    

                                                        (1) 
 
where H1, H2 and H3 represent three sequential hazards while P(DSH1<dsh1|SP0), P(DSH2<dsh2|SP1) 
and P(DSH3<dsh3|SP2) are the exceedance probability of damage for the considered hazards. The 
variability in the structural parameters is expressed by the structural system parameters SP0, SP1 and 
SP2 that consider the chain effects.  
 
 
3. CASE STUDY 
 
A five-story steel hospital building with dimension in plan of 82.3 m by 33.7 m, spans length of 9.1 m 
and 12.3 m, and the story height equal to 4.6 m is considered. The building has two external lateral 
moment resisting frames in the longest direction and bracing system in the other direction. The H 
sections (wide channel, W) have been used for beams and columns while hollow structural sections 
(HSS) have been designed for bracing system (Figure 2). The building is located in Oakland, 
California, US (Lat: 37.7792, Long: -122.1620). An additional source of electricity is provided, just in 
case of an unexpected power outage. It includes an aboveground LPG tank equipped of power sources, 
controls, transfer equipment, supervisory equipment and accessory situated outside the building. The 
tank has the capacity to generate 2500 kVA of electricity for 8 hours. The LPG tank has a total 
capacity of 3597 litres and it is located 9.2 m far from the building. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Internal bracing frame configuration in Y-direction 
 
Earthquake (main hazard), blast and fire have been assumed as sequential hazards. The sequence of 
hazards caused by the earthquake is not specified and depends on the localization of the high risk 
potential elements inside and outside the structure as well as their fragility. Logical tree of multi-
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hazard sequence for general healthcare facilities is represented in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Hazard sequence: earthquake-blast-fire 
 
The external fuel tank and building elements are both damaged by the earthquake. The fuel leakage 
can cause an ignition resulting a deflagration of the fuel inside the tank. This series of events may 
cause explosion of the tank and generate an impulsive air pressure load on the front face of the 
building. The heat of the gas explosion may also ignite any inflammable materials located within the 
buildings. In a short time the ignition generates flashover and fire propagates thorough the building 
compartment. Fragility curves for each hazard have been derived considering earthquake (P(DE>de)), 
blast (P(DB>db)), and fire (P(DF>df)) hazard. For this case study, the cumulative probability to 
exceed a specified level of damage is expressed in Equation 2. 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( | ) ( ) ( | ) ( | )P DS ds P DE de P DB db P B E P DF df P F B P B E                                     (2) 
 
Post-earthquake effects on the small size tanks have shown a low fragility of these elements. Thus, the 
associated probability to have an explosion and the associated damage exceedance probability is 
strongly reduced. For this reason, the proposed methodology has been applied neglecting the chain 
effects. 
 
3.1 Hazard Analysis 
 
3.1.1 Earthquake 
 
Five different Hazard Levels (HL) have been identified (50%, 20%, 10%, 5%, and 2% of exceedance 
probability in 100 years) and analyses for each of the levels have been conducted. The mean value of 
moment magnitude (MW,mean) and epicenter distance (Rmean) with the logarithmic spectral offset at 
reference period (ε(Tref)) have been evaluated according to Boore-Atkinson attenuation law for each 
HL (Boore and Atkinson 2008). All the data can be found through the interactive de-aggregation of 
USGS (2013). The shear wave velocity at the uppermost 30 m has been assumed equal to 736 m/s 
according to Global Vs30 Map Server. 
 
A new Ground Motion Selection and Modification (GMSM) procedure has been used to minimize the 
dispersion values of the Engineering Demand Parameter (EDP) calculated through dynamic analyses. 
Its functionality is based on the energy content of the motions in the frequency domain. Seven groups 
of acceleration histories (for both horizontal directions) have been selected for each HL in such a way 
to match the target spectrum at reference period of the building. The Conditional Mean Spectrum 
(Baker 2010) obtained from de-aggregation study (CMS-ε) has been considered as target spectrum. 
Boore-Atkinson attenuation model has been used to define the predicted spectral accelerations at the 
site, while the Baker and Jayaram model has been considered as correlation law (Baker and Jayaram 
2008). The first period of the structure has been selected as conditioning period (Tref). The five target 
spectra and the associated spectrum-compatible groups of ground motions have been obtained through 
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the software OPENSIGNAL 4.1 (Cimellaro and Marasco 2015). Parts of the results in terms of mean 
spectrum-compatibility have been illustrated in Figure 4Error! Reference source not found.. 
Moreover, the spectral acceleration at reference period has been considered as Intensity Measure (IM). 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Mean spectrum compatibility for the five HLs 
 
3.1.2 Blast 
 
After earthquake, the power supplier system (fuel tank, electrical components, etc.) may be slightly or 
severely damaged. A fuel leakage may be as a result of damaged valves, connections or pipes of a fuel 
tank. However, an explosion cannot occur when there is not ignition source and when the fuel 
concentration is less the flammable concentration range. Thus, explosion are usually determined by 
concentration of fuel, gas leakage and ignition source. Considering the three parameters as stochastic 
variables, the probability of explosion after earthquake (P(B/E)) of a damaged fuel tank is reported in 
Equation 3. 
 
( | ) L FC IP B E P P P                    (3) 
 
where PL represents the probability of fuel leakage, PFC is the probability to have maximum fuel 
concentration and PI defines the probability of ignition. In this case study, it has been assumed that the 
damage takes place on the pipe that is connected to the tank. This assumption is based on the fact that 
the tank has a small size. According to ATC P-58 (2012) the probability to have large gas leakage for 
small diameter piping system (D<10 cm) is given in terms of fragility function with accelerations as 
EDP (μ=1.1g, β=0.5). The probability to have maximum gas concentration has been estimated 
considering the failure of the pipe closeness to the joint connection. A simplified dynamic model has 
been developed to predict the maximum horizontal drift of the pipe.  The tank has been considered as 
rigid body, while its legs have been assumed having shear flexibility in horizontal direction. The 
anchor bolts have been designed according to UBC-97 (1997) in order to ensure full restraint at the 
base. The first period of the tank (Ttank) has been calculated considering different fuel quantity as HL 
(5%, 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%, 60%, 70%, 80%, 90%, 95%, and 100%). The occurrence of shear 
failure in the vertical pipe causes the maximum gas concentration. Based on this postulation and 
considering the maximum shear stress value on the cross section of the pipe, the failure spectral 
acceleration has been calculated (Equation 4). 
 
3
,
, 2 2 2 2 2
tan
45.44 1
( )( )
u d v
a failure
e i e e i i k
f LS
g E D D D D D D T
              
            (4) 
 
where fu,d  and E represent the ultimate stress and elastic modulus of the steel, respectively, De and Di 
are the external and internal pipe diameter, and Lv is the length of the vertical pipe. The occurrence of 
maximum gas concentration is recorded when the spectral acceleration of the selected ground motion 
exceeds the Sa,failure. In these cases, the probability to have maximum gas concentration has been 
assumed equal to 1 and 0 otherwise. Then, a tridimensional fragility curve has been developed by 
fitting a lognormal distribution of the data for each value of fuel quantity (IM1) and spectral 
acceleration at period of the tank (IM2). The ignition probability is provided with reference to the 
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maximum fuel quantity. The information required for risk data assessment is provided by the 
International Association of Oil and Gas producers (IAOGP 2010) in order to evaluate the 
probabilities of hydrocarbon releases igniting. In this case study, only delayed ignition probability has 
been considered, since immediate ignition needs sources close to the fuel leakage point. Release of 
flammable gases from small onshore LPG plant has been assumed as ignition scenario and the related 
probability function has been derived. The Bernoulli’s principle is used for the computation of 
maximum gas concentration (FCmax=29.70 kg/s). Figure 5a illustrates the probability to have explosion 
after earthquake. 
 
3.1.3 Fire 
 
The probability to have fire inside the building is related to the heat transmission due to the tank 
explosion. The Stefan Boltzmann’s law has been used to compute the heat flux for each point of the 
building in front of the tank. The twelve different tank fuel quantities have been assumed as first IM 
(IM1). The temperature at which LPG burns has been assumed to be 2300 K°, while the atmospheric 
transmissivity coefficient has been fixed to 0.66. The transfer configuration factor has been calculated 
for the entire external panel of the building (meshed with 0.5×0.5m elements). The computation of the 
heat flux on building façade has been accomplished with the help of a Matlab code. Supposing the 
external panel as fireproof, only the opening surfaces (windows, doors, etc.) have been considered as 
susceptible to trigger fire inside the building. The minimum value of heat flux that can cause 
flammable materials in a room to burst into flames has been assumed equal to 30 MJ/m2. 
 
Comparing the façade of the building with the heat flux map, the starting fire surface has been 
deduced for each fuel quantity value. The estimated conditional probability to have ignition of 
elements inside the building has been fixed to 1 whether the maximum heat flux on the opening is 
greater than the considered limit, and 0 otherwise. Thus, the probability to have ignition of 
inflammable materials inside the building after blasting (P(F/B)) has been estimated through a 
lognormal distribution fitting (Figure 5b). The gypsum plasterboard with steel studs have been 
considered as internal partition between adjacent columns.Since the gypsum panels are used as 
insulation system, they can be considered as fireproof materials. Thus, each volume identified by two 
adjacent columns has been considered as fire compartment. 
 
 Fuel quantity [%]
0 50 100 150 200 250
P(
F|
B
)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
 
               (a)                                (b) 
 
Figure 5. (a) probability to have an explosion after the earthquake, (b) probability to have the fire after the blast 
 
3.2 Methods and models 
 
3.2.1 Earthquake 
 
The time history analyses have been performed on an appropriately modeled three-dimensional 
structure utilizing SAP2000. The lateral resisting system is a dual system. It is made up of moment 
resisting frames and braces, in both directions. The beams and columns have H sections, while 
hollowed structural section (HSS) have been assigned to the braces. The concentrated plasticity model 
has been used to take into consideration the nonlinearity of the structural elements. According to 
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FEMA-356 (2000), Steel-beams Flexural Hinge (type Moment M3) and Steel-column Flexural Hinge 
(type P-M2-M3 with M-χ cylindrical domain) has been used for beam and column elements, 
respectively. The plastic hinges for brace elements have been modeled as Steel-braces Axial Hinges. A 
3% damping ratio has been assigned to the frames according to Rayleigh formulation. The nonlinear 
dynamic analyses have been performed using non-linear direct integration method, taking into account 
P-Δ effects and applying the horizontal acceleration time histories in the two principal directions of the 
building. 
 
3.2.2 Blast 
 
The methodology provided by Marasco et al. (2017) is adopted to perform the blast analysis. To do 
that, U.S. Army Technical Manual (TM5-1300 1990) has been used in this study to establish the blast 
load parameters required in structural analysis. Twelve different fuel quantities reported in Table 1 
representative of different IMs have been considered and the equivalent weight of TNT has been 
estimated accordingly. To perform nonlinear time history analysis, the typical blast overpressure time 
history provided by TM5-1300 has been applied. The blast time history overpressure has been 
idealized by rise of an equivalent triangular pulse of maximum reflected pressure (Pr) at an arrival 
time (tA) after the explosion (Figure 6). A fictitious duration (trf) has been determined in place of the 
actual positive duration (to) assuming the linear decay of overpressure given by Equation (5): 
 
2 /rf r rt i p                    (5) 
 
where ir is the reflected impulse and Pr is the maximum reflected pressure determined through the 
charts provided by TM5-1300. A similar procedure for the negative phase has been used whereas rise 
time of negative peak pressure has been considered equals to 0.25 to negative fictitious duration (trf-). 
The different blast pressure time histories specific to each structural member have been established 
corresponding to the different scaled distance parameter (Z) and potential charge weight for each blast 
IM. 
 
The blast dynamic pressure has been applied to the beams, columns and exterior walls of the exposed 
structural area on the front face of the explosion. The exterior walls have been considered as typical 
concrete masonry wall reinforced with vertical bars. Each wall has been simplified to an equivalent 
SDOF system in such a way that the deflection of the concentrated mass to be same as the mid-span of 
the actual wall. An elasto-perfectly plastic behavior for each wall has been defined and the dynamic 
characteristics have been adjusted for the condition of high-velocity impacts. A MATLAB code has 
been used to calculate the dynamic responses of the mid-span of the wall considering the plastic hinge 
formation (yielding rotation capacity). Then, resulted time history reactions have been directly applied 
to the adjacent beams in SAP2000 models. Blast pressure time histories relevant to the beams and 
columns have been applied directly on the framing elements. In order to take into account the effects 
of high-rapid load environment, mechanical properties of steel materials have been enhanced by 
means of dynamic increased factor (DIF). Finally, twelve different nonlinear time history analyses 
have been conducted. In the cases of the loss of the load-bearing capacity of key structural elements, 
the progressive collapse analyses have been carried out and thus the dynamic effects of removal of the 
failed elements have been evaluated using time history analyses. 
 
Table 1. Different fuel quantities as HL for the blast analysis. 
 
Hazard 
level 
1st 2nd 3td 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th 12th 
Fuel 5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 95 100 
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Figure 6. Idealized blast overpressure time history 
 
3.2.3 Fire 
 
The ignition of inflammable materials within the compartment generates a flashover that will then 
cause a rise in temperature. The fire curve for the compartment is majorly used to determine the 
design-basis fire action. The fire curve is simply the evaluation of post-flashover time-temperature 
relationship and is determined by the quantity of combustible materials (total calorific value), the 
velocity of combustion, and the ventilation conditions. The quantity of combustible materials (total 
calorific value) and the velocity of combustion are main determinant of the entire heat flux that is 
produced inside the compartment (qf). It is assumed that the compartment heat flux is normally 
distributed. The mean value and standard deviation are used to specify the exact fire load for different 
building category in accordance to EC1 (2002). The normal mean specific fire load and standard 
deviation for hospitals are 230 MJ/m2 and 69 respectively. In the study case, the specific heat flux of 
the compartment has been selected as IM2 and eight different exceedance probabilities have been 
considered (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Different fuel quantities as HL for the blast analysis. 
 
 90% 85% 80% 50% 20% 10% 5% 2% 
qf 
[MJ/m2] 135 160 180 230 281 322 360 400 
 
The temperature-time relationship developed by Lie (1974) has been considered. The peak 
temperature (Tpeak) and peak time (tpeak) are both used to describe the top of the curve. The definition of 
these parameters has been done in accordance to the time equivalence concept, which is related to the 
actual fire exposure to the standard test fire (standard curve). The ventilation factor w, is one of the 
main parameters used to evaluate the equivalent time. In the study case, two vertical openings having 
dimension of 1.50m×2.00m and opening factor of 0.07 have been considered. Table 3 resumes the 
major parameters of the temperature-time curves for each generated heat flux. An evaluation of the 
degradation of the physical and mechanical characteristics of the materials by fire has been conducted. 
In accordance to Fourier’s equation, the net transmitted heat flux (qf,n) is used to determine the thermal 
distribution for any fire scenario. In a system where the entire structural element is homogenous and 
isotropic, the Fourier’s equation can be incorporated into the element’s volume and then rephrase 
discretely to obtain Equation 6. 
 
( ) , ( )
/m
i sh f n i
A VT k q t
c
     

                (6) 
 
where ΔT(i) is a definition of ith increment of uniform temperature in the cross section area of the 
element while Am/V is the section factor given by the ratio between the area of the element exposed to 
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fire (Am) and its total volume (V). Density (ρ) and specific heat (c) refer to the materials that made up 
the structural element while Δt is the time it takes the change in temperature to take place (Δt<5s). The 
coefficient ksh is used to consider of the “shadow effects” that cause non-uniform thermal transversal 
distribution. In order to achieve a pseudo-uniform transversal temperature distribution, ksh coefficient 
has been assessed as the actual fire exposure. 
 
The element’s section factor that is taken as bin section ratio is represented as (Am/V)b, while (Am/V) 
represents the column’s actual section factor.The fire exposure for the column has been supposed for 
one side of the web and for both flanges. Three different sections of beams and columns have been 
identified for the compartment. Fire resistance of steel elements inside the compartment has been 
assessed considering the maximum uniform thermal loads for each heat flux value. The analyses have 
been accomplished with the help of the software SAP2000. The mechanical and physical materials 
properties have been modified according to AISC (2005) depending on the temperature values. The 
nonlinearity of the structural elements has been taken into account according to concentrated plasticity 
model. Progressive nonlinear analyses have been performed. The nonlinearity effects have been taken 
into account in accordance to concentrated plasticity model. Progressive nonlinear analyses have also 
been carried out. 
 
Table 3. Characteristic time-temperature curve parameters for each generated heat flux. 
 
 90% 85% 80% 50% 20% 10% 5% 2% 
te [min] 23.50 25.00 26.19 33.46 40.83 46.85 52.2 58.2 
Tpeak [K°] 1111 1131 1145 1173 1188 1205 1218 1228 
tpeak [min] 11.5 13.5 16 20.5 24.5 29.5 33.5 37 
 
3.3 Structural Responses 
 
3.3.1 Earthquake 
 
Maximum transient inter-story drifts have been considered as EDP to assess the performance of the 
structure under the seismic load. Fragility curves, for both principal horizontal directions, have been 
investigated for the different damage states (slight, moderate, extensive, and complete) according to 
ATC P-58 (2012) (Figure 7). 
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Figure 7. Fragility curves in X direction (a) and Y direction (b) for earthquake hazard 
 
3.3.2 Blast 
 
An accurate assessment of the global response of building under blast load has been accomplished by 
assuming the loss of horizontal stiffness as EDP. In the Y direction, response of the structure is 
integrated into the SDOF dynamic response based on the specification of Equation 7. 
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where dtop represents  the maximum top floor displacement and Vb is the base shear obtained at the 
same time of the maximum displacement. In this case, the actual distribution of floor displacements 
has been taken into consideration and this usually occur through the shape coefficients ∅i, where ith is 
associated to the floor displacement normalized with respect the top one. The yielding drift for braced 
system has been calculated according to ATC P-58 (2012) and the maximum drift threshold have been 
assumed (Table 4) for four different damage states. The stiffness reduction limits have also been 
computed. The computation involves an assumption of an elasto-perfectly plastic global behaviour of 
the steel frame. Figure 8a depicts the fragility curves for each DS. 
 
Table 4. Characteristic time-temperature curve parameters for each generated heat flux. 
 
Damage State Slight Moderate Extensive Complete 
Inter-story drift [%] 1.00 1.80 2.80 4.80 
Stiffness reduction [%] 30.00 61.00 75.00 85.00 
 
3.3.3 Fire 
 
The assessment of structural capacity has been carried out evaluating the highest obtainable deflection 
for beams and columns as EDP. In this case, two different damage states indicating the level of 
irreversible damage on the beam (DS1) and on the column (DS2) have been considered. The first 
damage state provides useful data on the highest flexural capacity of the beam.  It is assumed that the 
threshold vertical deflection (vb) for this damage state is equivalent to deflection attributed to 
uncontrolled vertical displacement. The second damage state is linked to the highest drift of the 
column (δc) which occurs under multiple stresses as a result of compression and bending moment and 
with full consideration of the P-Δ effects. It has been assumed that the drift’s highest limit coincides 
with the horizontal displacement that generates uncontrollable unstable displacement. For each 
analysis, the probability to have irreversible damage to the structural elements has been assumed equal 
to 1 if the response parameter is greater than the associated limit and 0 otherwise. Fragility curves 
have been developed fitting lognormal distribution to the data (Figure 8b). 
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Figure 8. (a) fragility curves for blast hazard, (b) fragility curves for fire hazard 
 
 
 
11 
 
4. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 
 
Equation 2 is used to derive the cumulative fragility function for each specific damage state. Figure 9 
is a graphical illustration for the fragility curves for earthquake (a), blast due to earthquake (b) and fire 
due to blast (c), with reference to a complete damage to the columns. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. (a) fragility curve for earthquake, (b) blast due to earthquake and (c) fire due to blast. 
 
The factors that are assumed to be IM parameters include; heat flux generated in the compartment, 
spectral acceleration at period of the structure, spectral acceleration at period of the tank and fuel 
quantity inside the tank. The three values also enable evaluation of the cumulative probability to 
exceed a particular level of damage. A numerical example of cumulative probability damage 
estimation has been performed considering the five different HL for earthquake, full capacity of tank 
and heat flux equal to the average value.In this case study building, the probability of cumulative 
damage values is shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Numerical example for cumulative damage calculation due to earthquake, blast and fire. 
 
HLE 
Sa(T) 
[g] 
Sa(Ttank) 
[g] P(DE>de) P(DB>db)·P(B|E) 
P(DF>df)·P(F|B) 
P(B|E) P(DS>ds) 
2% 1 0.95 0.99 0.0255 0.0079 1.00 
5% 0.75 0.85 0.96 0.0163 0.0059 0.98 
10% 0.55 0.75 0.89 0.0104 0.0040 0.90 
20% 0.40 0.65 0.50 0.0055 0.0023 0.51 
50% 0.20 0.40 0.01 0.0002 0.0001 0.01 
 
The probability encountering blast after an earthquake is strictly correlated to the tank’s size. In this 
case, the value of maximum gas concentration tends to lower the probability of explosion. 
Consequently, the conditioned probability to have fire after explosion is strongly reduced. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
A new methodology to estimate cumulative structural damage due to sequential hazardous events is 
proposed. Hazards interaction is assessed by using the various calibrated physical models to reduce the 
epistemic uncertainties of the model. Each hazard is considered as an independent phenomenon and 
the variation of the mechanical and physical parameters of the structural model under sequential 
hazards is estimated. The numerical example showed that the probability to exceed a given damage 
state due to an explosion and consequent fire are much smaller than the exceedance damage state 
probability for earthquake (less than 3%). This is due to the low probability to have explosion of the 
tank after earthquake. For the proposed case study, assuming the three hazards as independent 
phenomena is a reasonable hypothesis, since the chain effects do not influence the total damage 
estimation. The application of the proposed multi-hazard approach can be used for both improving the 
structural safety and reducing the building life cycle costs to enhance the resilience of the structure. 
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